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Abstract: The development of institutions of self-governance in India, and specifically the 2005 
reform—the National Rural Health Mission that introduced village health and sanitation 
committees—provide a unique opportunity to study the effects of the strengthening of the 
political agency on collective healthcare decision-making in rural areas. We use data from the 
District Level Household Survey and take advantage of the heterogeneity of maternal and child 
healthcare use, before and after the introduction of village health and sanitation committees. 
Specifically, we examine the effect of village health and sanitation committees on use of both 
public and preventive healthcare among children. Our results suggest that local democracy has 
increased access to preventive child healthcare services. Part of the effect is driven by an increase 
in the utilization of the public healthcare network. We find some evidence of an effect of village 
residence heads of a Panchayat on preventive healthcare use. 
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1 Introduction 
The development of institutions of self-governance can have important welfare effects for 
groups that are dependent on public services for essential healthcare. This is particularly the case 
for more vulnerable populations whose specific preferences and needs are not accounted for by 
either electoral processes or traditional forms of political participation. Indeed, traditional 
electoral processes often aggregate preferences in a crude way that can neglect the needs of large 
population groups. Processes of local political decentralization, in contrast, are argued to help 
accommodate locally scattered preferences and demands of a vulnerable population that might 
be different from those of the state. One of the important areas decentralization reforms have 
targeted is enhancing participation in collective healthcare system decision-making—that is, 
strengthening the role of local preferences in setting healthcare priority decisions. Healthcare is 
an essential policy area in which public intervention has frequently shown evidence of failure 
(Chaudhury et al. 2006). Hence, the involvement of local preferences in decision-making is 
expected to change the delivery of care. This paper attempts to contribute to testing the latter 
proposition. 
A paradigmatic country in which to examine the effects of local healthcare decentralization is 
India. India is one of the world’s largest countries run by a quasi-federal system in which states 
are increasingly gaining more control of their healthcare system. In 1992, the 73rd and 74th 
Amendments to the Constitution established the Panchayats Raj Institutions (PRIs), self-
governance agencies at the local level. The PRIs have financial resources, and one of their main 
activities is organizing village meetings to provide a forum to reduce problems of agency, which 
political decision makers typically suffer from. 
Village meetings (Gram Sabhas) are called by the Village Panchayat (VP) to discuss resource 
allocation decisions in the village including healthcare. A VP covers 1–5 villages, and the Gram 
Sabha, the village body consisting of participants on the electoral register, plays a role in 
supervising the VP by ratifying its budget and identifying potential untargeted beneficiaries. 
These meetings, intended to reduce problems of political agency, remain even after electoral 
participation, and better reflect the specific preferences of the citizenry. In particular, by 
involving minority groups and interest groups (e.g. women who can advise on maternal 
healthcare needs), these meetings ensure people are aware of the resources available and trade-
offs considered. Besley et al. (2005) find that these meetings helped the selection of beneficial 
welfare programmes, and disadvantaged groups appeared to benefit the most. However, further 
reforms were put forward in 2005 to set up village health and sanitation committees (VHCs) in 
the context of the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) in order to advance the remit of self-
governance by PRIs. This paper focuses on examining the effect of the introduction of specific 
health meetings on healthcare utilization. 
We study in a systematic way the effectiveness of VHCs as an intervention intensifying the local 
decentralization of the healthcare system. Preliminary evaluation of the functioning of the 
NRHM has been completed (Bajpai et al. 2009), but it is limited to a handful of healthcare 
outcomes, and it does not address the causal concerns of the non-random nature of setting up 
the VHCs. We fill these gaps in this evaluation. Specifically, given the remit of decisions typically 
made by VHCs, we examine the effect of VHCs on the use of maternal and child health (MCH) 
care services by estimating an instrumental variable model that adjusts for the non-random 
introduction of VHCs and provides causal inferences. Our estimates control for both time 
(survey interview date) and state-specific effects (given that healthcare is organized at the state 
level in India). We further examine the performance of VHCs by investigating whether the 
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VHCs develop village health plans and whether this has an effect on the use of public healthcare 
and specific preventive and MCH care services. 
Our paper contributes to the wider literature by examining a specific case in which a policy 
intervention can be identified. We contribute to the literature on the expansion of political 
agency in India (Besley et al. 2005) by examining the specific effect of VHCs. One previous 
study (Kumar and Prakash 2012) has examined a related question, focusing on two states in 
India (Bihar and Jharkhand). They studied the effect of both decentralization and women’s 
reservations (a requirement that one-third of village council leadership positions are reserved for 
women) on safe deliveries and institutional births. We follow a different strategy. We draw upon 
the variability in the adoption of VHCs and the different timing of births, and study the effect on 
a more comprehensive set of outcomes—MCH care services—for all the representative samples 
of Indian states covered by the District Level Household Survey (DLHS), which is a sample of 
202,000 individual respondents. We employ an instrumental variable strategy to account for the 
omitted variable bias present in the adoption of VHCs. Namely, the adoption of VHCs is not a 
random event, but one that results from some common unobservable element such as the 
presence of modernizers in the community, which we pick up by examining the potential 
penetration of new ideas due to better communications. 
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides the background; Section 3 is 
devoted to the data and methods; Section 4 contains the results; and Section 5 concludes. 
2 Background 
2.1 Political agency and health services 
Local democracy is expected to improve healthcare delivery. However, the precise mechanisms 
underpinning such effect are still unclear. It might well be that opposition and minority groups 
lose interest in council/village meetings, or see themselves as ineffective, which might 
consolidate the ruling elite (Bardhan 2002). More generally, traditional fiscal federalism literature 
(which envisages decentralization reforms as resulting from a trade-off between the costs 
associated with the presence of spillovers and economies of scale versus heterogeneity costs), 
need to deal with issues related to government accountability. In a similar low-income context, 
Faguet (2001) finds evidence of an important expansion in the quality of social services in Bolivia 
after municipalities took control of social service delivery. The latter can be explained by the 
political incentive to deliver visible policy outcomes to constituents in order to get re-elected. 
However, whether this result applies across the board, and specifically whether it can be 
extended to healthcare services is not clear-cut. Healthcare is an area in which there are 
important information asymmetries, and hence improvement in government accountability 
might not always translate immediately into better outcomes. However, among all areas of 
healthcare delivery, one would expect to see an effect on the uptake of preventive care, which is 
typically associated with an unsatisfied demand for health, and could arguably be better 
addressed when a channel is offered for collective healthcare decision-making to aggregate 
demands for healthcare improvement. 
Probably, the most important argument to advocate for further health system decentralization is 
government accountability. Local or regional governments tend to have an informational 
advantage in identifying the needs of their populations, and if governments are more accountable 
at lower levels there might be ‘political incentives’ for politicians at the local level to use that 
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advantage to get re-elected. Hence, if the latter holds true, one would expect the quality of public 
healthcare to improve under decentralized governments. Azfar et al. (2000) surveyed the 
preferences of individuals (constituents) and bureaucrats at different levels of government in the 
Philippines; they found evidence of a positive correlation between constituents’ and bureaucrats’ 
preferences at the local level, but no correlation at higher levels of government. However, the 
question of the efficiency of centralization has to grapple with elite capture—that is, whether the 
central or state government is more likely to be captured by elites than is the local government. 
This would impact service delivery, together with efficiency, as authority is allocated to those 
responsive to social needs. The extent of elite capture depends on the existence of social 
inequality, which could pave the way for some elite collusion and avoid catering to people’s 
needs. As Bardhan (2002) argues, the extent of local capture depends on traditions of public 
participation, regulation, and media attention. But the general view is that central governments 
are more likely to be captured, given the larger returns of doing so, which explains to some 
extent the large funds being spent on national political campaigns. In contrast, local governments 
are more trusted and deliver more satisfaction (on visible dimensions of public service) than 
central governments. Some consistent evidence with the argument is found in Brazil, where the 
number of public clinics and consultation rooms—the visible public goods—are positively 
related to voter turnout, but not the number of doctors and nurses (Mobarak et al. 2011). Hence, 
one would expect decentralized governance to result in greater use of public services (mostly 
visible to the public), and especially public healthcare. 
One of the limitations of traditional fiscal federalism approaches lies in the consideration of 
information asymmetries, specifically among poorer population groups who might not be informed 
enough to make efficient ‘voting with one’s feet’ decisions. In the case of healthcare, information 
asymmetries can be significant as information is often technical, and hence the objective quality 
is not clearly observable. Furthermore, many services are community-specific and often either 
exclude non-residents or impose transaction costs on non-residents and outsiders. This is 
especially the case in developing countries, which lag behind in institutional development, and it 
is not uncommon to find that they are subject to the governance of corrupt bureaucrats. The 
latter makes accountability more complex to trace, and hence returns of decentralization are not 
always granted 
Given that the funds/taxes decentralized to local levels of government are less flexible and more 
regressive, there is some degree of concentration of economic activity in certain areas, which can 
create territorial inequalities. Local governments in poor areas face difficulty in raising fiscal 
revenues, and thus creating a pervasive fiscal imbalance. In India, Bardhan (2002) argues there is 
evidence that local democracy and states are more effective than central government, but then 
again, there are large differences across states; for example, West Bengal is a state with high trust 
and Bihar is one with low trust (Mitra and Singh 1999). Despite spending a small share of gross 
domestic product (GDP) on healthcare, a disproportionate share of the health budget is 
dedicated to inpatient care, as opposed to preventive care—the latter being more pro-poor 
(Peters et al. 2002). Hence, this paper focuses primarily on public, preventive, and outpatient 
care. In India, evidence suggests that while a higher voter turnout in a district increases the 
allocation of nurses to rural areas of the district, it has no effect on the allocation of doctors and 
has a negative effect on the allocation of teachers (Betancourt and Gleason 2000). 
2.2 Governance in India 
Decentralization of governance has always been envisaged in post-independence India. In a 
predominately rural and heterogeneous country like India, decentralization was foreseen to bring 
inclusive development. PRIs constitutional amendments were based on the premise that local 
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government would lead and manage social programmes by adapting them to local contexts, and 
would be accountable to the community they serve. However, the vision that self-government 
would pave the way for development remained an unrealized goal even after two decades of 
PRIs. PRIs were riddled with problems: they lacked political and bureaucratic power, which 
continued to be held by the state and central government, and they were largely constituted of 
higher caste members. Weaker sections of society, like the scheduled tribes (STs), scheduled 
castes (SCs), and women, were not adequately represented in local government. This was 
particularly problematic in healthcare, given the serious consequences of poor governance.  
In India, public health and sanitation, and management of hospitals and dispensaries, are the 
state’s responsibility. Medical education, medical professionals, and family control are the joint 
responsibilities of the central government and the states. In terms of health budgets, district 
officials aggregate demand for healthcare provision from local governments (PRIs) and present 
them to the state government. These are then discussed in the respective state legislative 
assemblies and incorporated into state budgets. The implementation of policy decisions mainly 
rests with the District Planning Committees that coordinate information flows from the lower 
levels to the states. When power over the implementation of developmental projects was 
devolved to the district and village levels, according to the 1993 Constitutional Amendments, the 
PRI structure included elected bodies at the village, block, and districts levels, with the exception 
of small states with populations under two million people. Panchayat elections take place every 
five years, and one-third of the seats are reserved for women and SCs/STs; state legislation can 
further reserve seats for other underrepresented groups. 
The PRI amendments listed the functions suitable for devolution to the VPs; states, however, 
had considerable autonomy in interpreting and defining the scope of decentralization. Although 
these amendments were a big step in the decentralization process, there was some degree of 
uncertainty about the precise role of Panchayats in the political, administrative, and fiscal 
functioning of the states, and over the years the process and reach of decentralization varied 
across states. Johnson (2003) and Singh (2008) argue that decentralization in India has been 
implemented with uneven distribution of tax and administrative capacities. Kerala is probably the 
best example of decentralization, where VPs were given real autonomy and fiscal devolution. In 
many other states, the role of VPs remained restricted. Gram Sabhas often had no power to 
approve plans and budgets, their role was mainly seen as consultative. The PRIs, on the other 
hand, acted mainly as executing and supervisory agents for the state government. 
The second wave of impetus to decentralization, specifically targeting the health sector, was 
brought about by the NRHM in 2005. The NRHM was launched to bring about ‘necessary 
architectural correction in the basic healthcare delivery system’, with the goal of improving the 
availability of and access to good-quality healthcare services, especially for those residing in rural 
areas. The NRHM action plan included multiple, interlinked components aimed at increasing 
decentralization of decision-making and management of health programmes. It established the 
VHCs, the standing committee of the VP, to provide oversight of all NRHM activities at the 
village level. Under the NRHM, VHCs are central to ‘local-level community action’ and to 
fostering decentralized health planning. A VHC has a minimum of 15 members, which includes 
members of the VP (with priority given to elected, women VP members) and community 
(including those working in the health sector, service users and members of community-based 
organizations). Fifty per cent of the VHC members should be women, and SCs, STs, and 
minorities should be adequately represented as per their population in the village. 
Specifically, VHCs are responsible for developing village health plans and for managing an 
untied fund of Rs.10,000 per annum to enable local planning and action. They organize health-
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promotion activities and mobilize pregnant women and children to access maternal and 
healthcare services, especially antenatal care (ANC), facility delivery, postnatal care (PNC), and 
child immunizations. 
2.3 Health care governance in India 
India’s health care performance is still far from what is desired, and is still heavily burdened. 
Importantly, such a burden can be significantly reduced as many existing morbidities and 
mortalities are preventable, often with access to primary care, which is provided by the public 
health network. The Indian health system was initially designed as a publicly funded and run 
system that would provide healthcare free of charge. Policy reform has emphasized primary 
healthcare with a limited private sector presence.  
In India, public spending on health is about 4 per cent of GDP, but the health system is wasteful 
and there is great scope for significant efficiency improvements. Currently it is inefficient and 
delivers very low-quality health services, so much so that the private sector has become the de 
facto provider of health services in India. Although privately purchased or employer-provided 
health insurance is available to only a small share of the population (Reddy 2015), even the poor 
frequently choose private healthcare—which is an unregulated sector. Hence, the extra financial 
burden of ill health can exacerbate problems of poverty. Indeed, 70 per cent of healthcare 
expenditures consist of out-of-pocket spending, which is highly impoverishing (Reddy 2015). 
Healthcare infrastructure has often been underutilized and inefficiently run (Reddy 2015). Most 
programmes have focused on maternal and child health, infectious diseases, and family planning. 
Yet, it is inadequate in terms of coverage of the population, especially in rural areas, and grossly 
underutilized because of the dismal quality of healthcare provided. It is not uncommon that 
public health centres are understaffed due to absenteeism and that drugs and equipment are 
missing or in short supply. Absenteeism is particularly costly because it has an associated salary 
burden (Chaudhury et al. 2006). Similarly, it is not uncommon for rural health posts to remain 
vacant due to lack of availability of qualified doctors and other healthcare workers; further, 
absenteeism is encouraged due to lack of effective monitoring. Rural healthcare structure is often 
unable to respond effectively to local realities and needs. 
It is against the background described above that the NRHM was created in 2005 in an effort to 
improve public health services, with a special focus on states with weak public health 
infrastructure and indicators. The NRHM focuses mostly on maternal and child health, aiming to 
reduce mortality in those groups to the Millennium Development Goal targets; it is focused on 
18 states designated as ‘high-focus states’ (Reddy 2015). The original primary goal was to increase 
the availability of, as well as access to, quality healthcare among those living in rural areas, 
especially the poorest groups, women, and children. The NRHM is undoubtedly the most 
ambitious rural health initiative to be launched in post-independence India by the United 
Progressive Alliance (UPA) of various political parties coming together after the 2004 general 
election. The NRHM envisages an incremental 30 per cent budget over existing budgetary 
outlays every year to meet the goal of increasing the public health outlay from 0.9 per cent to 2–3 
per cent of GDP. The states are expected to raise their contributions by a minimum of 10 per 
cent per year to support the programme. 
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3 Data and methods 
3.1 The data 
We use the Indian DLHS1, repeated cross-sections, to study the effect of the NRHM. The 
District Level Household and Facility Survey (DLHS-3), administered during 2007 and 2008, is 
one of the largest ever demographic and health surveys carried out in India, with a sample size of 
about seven million households, covering all districts of the country. This survey was designed to 
capture the impact of the NRHM on MCH outcomes, family planning, and other reproductive 
health indicators. Unlike the previous two waves, DLHS-3 interviewed married women (aged 
15–49) and also unmarried women (aged 15–24) as respondents. Questionnaires were bilingual, 
in the local language and in English. The advantage of this data-set is that it provides individual-, 
household-, and village-level information. 
MCH information was collected from 1,245,590 women (451,951 households) across India. 
Women were specifically asked about their use of maternal health services (ANC, delivery, and 
PNC) for the most recent birth in the last five years, and immunization information was 
collected for the youngest two surviving children born during this time. We therefore use data 
pertaining to the youngest child born during 2004–08 (169,672 children) to study the use of 
maternal health services, and we use data pertaining to the youngest two children born during 
2004–08 (211,964 children) to explore immunization uptake. 
The village data2 in DLHS-3 allows us to identify the presence of a VHC in the village. It further 
allows us to access the performance of these committees, for example by examining whether the 
VHC develops health plans. The DLHS-3 data pertain to 22,508 communities spread across 592 
districts and 34 states (excluding Nagaland). After the launch of the NRHM, 28.9 per cent of the 
villages set up a VHC (see Appendix Table A1 for the names of such villages and samples). 
Further, 61.2 per cent of the VHCs develop village health plans and 44.8 per cent manage untied 
fund of Rs.10,000. Hence, the data-set allows us to go beyond intention-to-treat estimates and 
measure the treatment effect on the treated quite precisely. By examining the use of MCH 
services we can compare the effects of the introduction of VHCs on the probability of using 
MCH services, before and after the introduction of the NRHM. 
The DLHS-3 survey was designed using multi-stage stratified systematic sampling using the 2001 
census from India as a sampling frame.  Specifically, the design is based on districts alongside 50 
primary sampling units (PSUs)—which were census villages in rural areas and urban wards—
selected in the first stage by systematic probability proportional to size sampling. PSUs were 
stratified by number of households into three strata—fewer than 50, between 50 and 300, and 
more than 300 households. 
3.2 Econometric strategy 
The empirical strategy of the paper focuses on outcomes that can be measured for the period 
before and after the NRHM reform. We apply an instrumental variable (IV) strategy, given that it 
                                                 
1
 Districts are administrative units lower than states that play an active role in areas of welfare such as healthcare.  
2 In the survey this refers to the PSU, which could be a single village or a group of smaller villages. Sometimes larger 
villages were also split into two or more PSUs. 
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does not seem reasonable to assume that the VHCs were set up at random. For the health 
outcomes, we observe births before and after the reform; we can write the following estimation: 
�ܻ� = ߛ଴ + ߛଵ�݁�݀�� + ߛଶ������ + ߛଷܺ��� + �� + ߜ� + ߝ�� (1) 
Y refers to the use of MCH services (ANC, public facility delivery, PNC, and immunizations). 
Our regression on healthcare utilization and exposure to VHCs allows identification of political 
externalities, as in Besley et al. (2005), and i refers to individuals, g refers to the state/village, and 
t refers to time. Our parameter of interest is γ2, which identifies the changes in healthcare 
utilization after the introduction of VHCs, over and above the effect of time trends and state 
fixed effects and alongside a number of controls for confounding effects. Our exposure variable 
refers to being exposed to a VHC. We control for contextual effects such as the household 
head’s and mother’s and child’s characteristics. We include as a control the variable ‘head’, which  
controls for the fact that villages where heads of Panchayat live might exhibit systematically 
better outcomes. We use a linear model since fixed effects probit estimates are inconsistent in 
short panels (Nickell 1981). Standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity 
and clustered at the household level. The identifying assumption is that the timing of policy 
change is not correlated with the trends in healthcare use. Treated cohorts are born after 2005, 
while control cohorts are born before, and we take advantage of the variation of birth dates. 
In this section we explain further our empirical strategy and discuss how we address some 
potential threats to the specification that could have biased our results. From an econometric 
perspective, the natural question would be whether the variation in treatment can be deemed 
exogenous and, if not, whether we know what determined implementation—for example, 
whether it was a phased-in programme with phase-in defined by the literacy rate in the district, 
or whether there was simply a variation in bureaucratic efficiency in implementing a state-wide 
programme. In our data-set we can clearly identify the use of healthcare services and whether the 
village has a VHC, but the data are only available for one wave that contains two years following 
the implementation of the reform. In addition, it can be argued that the presence of common 
unobservables may drive both the introduction of VHCs and healthcare use. Hence, we have 
chosen to follow an IV strategy. An IV strategy requires an instrumental variable that should 
influence the intervention (in our case, setting up of the VHC) but should not be related to the 
outcome (i.e. MCH service use). The IV we use is whether the village is connected by an all-
weather road to the district headquarters. We expect the connection to the district headquarters 
to be a source of the introduction and transference of new ideas about social reforms, which will 
explain the creation of a VHC, but will not influence healthcare utilization. The instrument is 
hence theoretically valid, and we will test whether it is statistically significant and strong We 
therefore estimate the following: ����� = �଴ + �ଵ�݋݊݊݁ܿ�݁݀�� + �ଶܺ�� + �� + ߜ� + ߝ�� (2) 
The Wu–Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of endogeneity, and the first stage indicated a 
value of the F exceeding the Staiger criteria with a value for 23; the coefficient, as expected, 
appears to be significant and positively associated with the exposure to a VHC. Another threat to 
the specification lies in the presence of district–year varying changes in other determinants, 
which we address by controlling for unobservable trends. In the specification illustrated above 
we control for state-specific trends, and in extensions of this we demonstrate robustness to 
district-specific trends and district by mother-cohort effects. We also control for time effects that 
control for the effect of time-specific covariates. We include the date of data collection (month 
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and year) and year of birth. In addition, we run different specifications (OLS and IV), and we 
employ different treatment variables. 
3.3 Falsification tests 
We examine the effects on the use of MCH services before the NRHM for a subsample of 
states, to confirm that we are identifying the effect of the programme (which we do not report 
here). In addition, we measure the effect on the use of private healthcare services for deliveries 
to test whether the effects we are identifying are the intended outcomes, as the creation of the 
VHC should encourage the use of public facilities and consequently should reduce the use of 
private health facilities. 
3.4 Variables 
Table 1 reports the main dependent variables of the study, which refer to whether the 
respondent delivered a child in a public health, facility consistent with the hypothesis that 
increasing the political agency would have enhanced the use of public healthcare in the context 
of India, where public healthcare is underused. The second set of variables includes a list of 
MCH services, including child immunizations against tuberculosis (Bacillus Calmette-Guérin 
vaccine, BCG), diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DTP), and polio, and deliveries under 
caesarean section, which mainly refers to surgical procedures typically employed in high-risk 
deliveries. Table 1 includes the treatment variables of interest, including the presence of a VHC, 
which affect about 15 per cent of our sample and whether the VHC developed the health plans. 
In addition, we include information about whether the head of the VP lives in the community 
(41 per cent), the religion and caste of the household head, socioeconomic status (SES), mother’s 
age at birth, whether the mother ever attended school, and the sex of the child. Also, we include 
another variable, JSY, which indicates whether the mother received benefits from a cash transfer 
scheme (Janani Suraksha Yojana, JSY) that was launched at the same time as the NRHM to 
promote institutional deliveries among poor mothers. 
Figure 1 provides evidence on the uptake of immunization pre- and post-NRHM for areas with 
and without a VHC. For all vaccines considered (BCG, DTP, and polio) we find that where 
there is no VHC after the introduction of the NRHM there is an average pre-NRHM 
immunization uptake, while for areas with a VHC there is a spike in immunizations after the 
introduction of the NRHM. Similarly, Figure 2 shows that non-VHC areas exhibit average 
maternal healthcare use of deliveries in public facilities, caesarean section, ANC, and PNC. In 
contrast, we observe a spike after the introduction of a VHC. Nonetheless, these figures do not 
allow us to distinguish whether the effects are driven by other confounding factors rather than 
the introduction of a VHC. We need to review the results in the following section to gather a 
better picture of the effect of the introduction of VHCs. 
4 Results 
4.1 Effect of VHCs on the use of public health facilities for deliveries 
Given that a widespread improvement in MCH would require an expansion of access to public 
healthcare, Table 2 reports the effect of VHCs on the use of public health facilities for deliveries. 
Specifically column 1 offers a naive specification without controls; column 2 includes a number 
of controls, in addition to time effects that control for the effect of time-specific covariates. 
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Column 3 includes state fixed effects to control for state effects. Column 4 presents the effects 
of setting up a VHC, adjusting for endogeneity by using an IV. The results suggest that, as 
expected, the introduction of a VHC increased the probability of using public health facilities for 
deliveries. The coefficient is consistent with the idea suggested in the paper, that the 
strengthening of political agency is linked to an expansion of the use of public healthcare. The 
increase is significant when the household head is Hindu. Further, poorer households and 
educated mothers have a higher probability of using public health facilities. However, 
households with SC/ST heads, larger households, older mothers, and male children have a lower 
probability of using public facilities for deliveries. 
4.2 Caesarean deliveries 
Using the same empirical strategy, we examine the effect on caesarean deliveries in Table 3. We 
find that the introduction of a VHC increases the probability of caesarean deliveries. Similar to 
the results on public health facility deliveries, the probability of caesarean deliveries is higher for 
households with a Hindu head, richer households, educated mothers, and male children, and 
lower for households with SC/ST heads and larger households. However, unlike the results for 
public health facility deliveries, the probability of caesarean deliveries increases with the mother’s 
age, which is expected as caesarean deliveries are more prevalent among older mothers in other 
contexts as well. 
4.3 Use of ANC and PNC services 
The effects of VHCs on the use of ANC and PNC are shown in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. 
These results are similar—a VHC has a significant and positive effect on the use of both ANC 
and PNC services. Further, the probability of using ANC and PNC services is higher for Hindu, 
richer, and smaller households. It is also higher for educated mothers and male children, but 
lower for older mothers and for SC/ST households. 
4.4 Immunizations 
Tables 6, 7, and 8 report the effect of the introduction of VHCs on immunizations, consistently 
showing that VHCs increased the probability of a child being immunized with BCG, polio, and 
DTP vaccines. Further, the probability of the child receiving all of these immunizations is higher 
when the household head is Hindu, for richer and smaller households, for educated mothers, 
and for male children. The probability, however, reduces for older women and there are no 
differences among caste groups. 
4.5 Performance of VHCs 
The effect of the performance of VHCs, measured by whether a VHC drafts village health plans, 
on the use of maternal healthcare services and immunizations are presented in Tables 9 and 10 
(only IV models). VHCs that draft health plans increase the use of both maternal healthcare 
services (deliveries in public health facilities, caesarean deliveries, ANC, and PNC) as well as 
immunizations (BCG, polio, and DTP). Consistently, the probability is higher among Hindu 
households, smaller households, educated mothers, and for male children. It is also higher 
among richer households, except for public facility deliveries, which are higher among poorer 
households. The probability is less consistent with regard to SC/ST status and the mother’s age. 
Although STs/SCs have a higher probability of public facility deliveries and of being immunized 
against BCG (at 10 per cent significance) and DTP (at 5 per cent significance), the probability is 
lower for caesarean deliveries and for ANC and PNC. Older mothers have a higher probability 
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of public facility deliveries but a lower probability of using ANC and PNC services, and a lower 
probability also of their children being immunized. 
4.6 Effect of VHCs on the use of private health facilities for deliveries 
Table 11 shows that VHC reduced deliveries in private health facilities. This reduction was 
significant for households with Hindu heads, educated mothers, and male children. However, the 
probability of deliveries at private facilities increased for ST/SC-headed households, larger 
households, and older mothers. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper has examined the effects of the strengthening of political agency in the Indian health 
system after the introduction of the NRHM, which created VHCs, which in turn increased 
further political accountability with regards to healthcare. Specifically, we have examined two of 
the recurrent health system shortcomings, namely the limited use of public healthcare and the 
limited use of preventive care, drawing from a number of observable services such as the use of 
caesarean sections, ANC, PNC, child vaccinations, and the use of both public and private 
healthcare. We have relied on an empirical strategy that is explained by the introduction of 
voluntary health councils which can be identified using an IV approach. 
Our results suggest that the implementation of VHCs has increased the probability of preventive 
healthcare utilization regarding obstetric care and vaccinations. Specifically, we find that it 
increases public healthcare use and the uptake of immunizations as well as the use of caesarean 
sections. We show that part of the effect lies in the increasing probability of using the public 
health network, which is rather underused in India. That is, the probability of a delivery in a 
public health facility was found to increase after the adoption of a VHC. As a falsification test, 
we find that the use of private healthcare delivery declined by a comparable magnitude. We find 
that when a village is the residence of a head of a Panchayat, it exhibits higher use of public 
healthcare and higher preventive and maternal healthcare use. This finding is suggestive that 
even when examining differences across villages in a decentralized context such as the Indian 
one, there are important differences that result from proximity to decision-making. 
These findings suggest that strengthening political agency can, as expected, increase the use of 
healthcare services that can, in turn, prevent certain conditions, and especially increase the use of 
(underused) public healthcare facilities. This is especially important when a programme such as 
the NRHM targets more deprived areas that have a greater capacity to benefit. Policy 
implications indicate that the strengthening of political agency is an alternative to privatizing the 
health system, and is in line with a wider policy strategy to expand preventive healthcare use. 
Hence, policy recommendations indicate that greater constituent involvement in collective 
healthcare decision-making can increase the use of public health, and can have a significant effect 
on the adoption of desirable preventive approaches. 
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Figures and tables 
Figure 1: Immunization uptake, pre and post-NRHM period 
 
Source: Indian District Level Household surveys, all waves.  
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Figure 2: Maternal health care use, pre- and post-NRHM 
 
Source: Indian District Level Household surveys, all waves.  
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Table 1: Variable definitions and description 
Variable Definition Mean (SD) or 
Percentage 
Dependent variables 
Public Delivery in a public health facility = 1; 0 otherwise 23% 
Caesarean Caesarean delivery = 1; 0 otherwise 6% 
ANC Had at least one antenatal care visit = 1; 0 otherwise 70% 
PNC Had PNC within two weeks of birth = 1; 0 otherwise 39% 
BCG Child had BCG vaccine = 1; 0 otherwise 89% 
Polio Child had polio vaccine within two weeks of birth = 1; 0 otherwise 60% 
DTP Child had at least one dose of DTP vaccine = 1; 0 otherwise 83% 
Independent variables—decentralization 
VHC Village had a VHC = 1; 0 otherwise 15% 
Health plan VHC developed village health plans = 1; 0 otherwise 14% 
Independent variables—other variables 
Head Panchayat head lives in the village = 1; 0 otherwise 41% 
Hindu Household head is a Hindu = 1; 0 otherwise 76% 
ST/SC Household belongs to ST/SC caste = 1; 0 otherwise 40% 
SES Household in the poorest SES quintile = 1 25% 
 Household in SES quintile 2 = 2 25% 
 Household in SES quintile 3 = 3 23% 
 Household in SES quintile 4 = 4 18% 
 Household in the richest SES quintile = 5 9% 
Size Number of family members in the household 7 (3) 
Age Mother’s age at the time of delivery 25 (5) 
School Mother ever attended school = 1; 0 otherwise 50% 
Boy Child is a boy = 1; 0 if girl 52% 
JSY Mother received any benefit under JSY = 1; 0 otherwise 11% 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Table 2: Effect of VHC on utilization of public health facility for deliveries 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS IV 
     
VHC 0.086*** 0.029*** 0.006** 0.676*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.085) 
Head  0.025*** 0.001 0.044*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Hindu  0.015*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
ST/SC  0.009*** −0.011*** −0.013*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
SES = 2  0.038*** 0.035*** 0.028*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
SES = 3  0.082*** 0.066*** 0.052*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
SES = 4  0.123*** 0.101*** 0.078*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
SES = 5 (richest)  0.113*** 0.096*** 0.066*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Size  −0.005*** −0.003*** −0.003*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age  −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
School  0.073*** 0.049*** 0.043*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Boy  0.002 0.002 0.003 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
JSY  0.535*** 0.496*** 0.488*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 0.214*** −0.003 0.393*** 0.356*** 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.016) (0.019) 
Time effects No Yes Yes Yes 
State FE No No Yes Yes 
     
Observations 169,572 169,535 169,535 169,535 
R-squared 0.006 0.206 0.255  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Table 3: Effect of VHC on caesarean deliveries 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS IV 
     
VHC 0.041*** 0.027*** 0.007*** 0.144*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.043) 
Head  0.002 −0.001 0.007** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Hindu  −0.002 0.009*** 0.009*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
ST/SC  −0.014*** −0.015*** −0.016*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SES = 2  0.007*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SES = 3  0.025*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
SES = 4  0.064*** 0.052*** 0.047*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
SES = 5 (richest)  0.137*** 0.120*** 0.113*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Size  −0.004*** −0.002*** −0.003*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age  0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
School  0.033*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Boy  0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
JSY  0.016*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 0.054*** 0.091*** 0.102*** 0.094*** 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) 
Time effects No Yes Yes Yes 
State FE No No Yes Yes 
     
Observations 169,553 169,521 169,521 169,521 
R-squared 0.004 0.049 0.078 0.043 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Table 4: Effect of VHC on utilization of ANC 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS IV 
     
VHC 0.129*** 0.070*** 0.027*** 0.718*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.103) 
Head  0.018*** −0.007*** 0.037*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) 
Hindu  0.026*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ST/SC  −0.031*** −0.030*** −0.032*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
SES = 2  0.054*** 0.066*** 0.058*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
SES = 3  0.122*** 0.124*** 0.110*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
SES = 4  0.192*** 0.190*** 0.167*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
SES = 5 (richest)  0.258*** 0.257*** 0.226*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
Size  −0.007*** −0.004*** −0.004*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age  −0.006*** −0.005*** −0.005*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
School  0.146*** 0.117*** 0.112*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Boy  0.002 0.005*** 0.006*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
JSY  0.138*** 0.129*** 0.120*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant 0.679*** 0.561*** 0.212*** 0.174*** 
 (0.001) (0.011) (0.018) (0.021) 
Time effects No Yes Yes Yes 
State FE No No Yes Yes 
     
Observations 169,567 169,527 169,527 169,527 
R-squared 0.011 0.129 0.191  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Table 5: Effect of VHCs on utilization of PNC 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS IV 
     
VHC 0.154*** 0.079*** 0.008** 1.261*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.123) 
Head  −0.017*** −0.008*** 0.067*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) 
Hindu  −0.021*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
ST/SC  −0.026*** −0.043*** −0.049*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
SES = 2  0.055*** 0.044*** 0.032*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
SES = 3  0.140*** 0.105*** 0.084*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
SES = 4  0.253*** 0.197*** 0.159*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
SES = 5 (richest)  0.426*** 0.336*** 0.284*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) 
Size  −0.009*** −0.005*** −0.005*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age  −0.003*** −0.001*** −0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
School  0.101*** 0.080*** 0.072*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Boy  0.012*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
JSY  0.285*** 0.282*** 0.262*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Constant 0.370*** 0.519*** 0.466*** 0.389*** 
 (0.001) (0.011) (0.019) (0.026) 
Time effects No Yes Yes Yes 
State FE No No Yes Yes 
     
Observations 162,319 162,278 162,278 162,278 
R−squared 0.013 0.159 0.221  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Table 6: Effect of VHCs on BCG vaccine uptake 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS IV 
     
VHC 0.042*** 0.014*** −0.004* 0.448*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.093) 
Head  0.019*** −0.001 0.023*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
Hindu  0.043*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
ST/SC  0.032*** 0.003** 0.002 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
SES = 2  0.027*** 0.030*** 0.026*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SES = 3  0.058*** 0.055*** 0.048*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SES = 4  0.079*** 0.076*** 0.063*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
SES = 5 (richest)  0.103*** 0.102*** 0.084*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Size  −0.004*** −0.002*** −0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age  −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
School  0.085*** 0.056*** 0.054*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Boy  0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
JSY  0.066*** 0.035*** 0.030*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 0.884*** 0.646*** 0.847*** 0.825*** 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.013) (0.015) 
Time effects No Yes Yes Yes 
State FE No No Yes Yes 
     
Observations 191,952 191,833 191,833 191,833 
R-squared 0.002 0.069 0.133  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Table 7: Effect of VHCs on polio vaccine uptake 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS IV 
     
VHC 0.084*** 0.043*** −0.010** 0.619*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.162) 
Head  −0.015*** −0.003 0.028*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) 
Hindu  0.064*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
ST/SC  0.016*** −0.002 −0.005 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
SES = 2  0.038*** 0.031*** 0.025*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
SES = 3  0.096*** 0.073*** 0.064*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
SES = 4  0.142*** 0.112*** 0.097*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
SES = 5 (richest)  0.214*** 0.170*** 0.149*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
Size  −0.005*** −0.003*** −0.003*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Age  −0.001*** −0.001** −0.001** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
School  0.073*** 0.048*** 0.044*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Boy  0.008*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
JSY  0.101*** 0.086*** 0.078*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Constant 0.591*** 0.710*** 1.024*** 1.001*** 
 (0.002) (0.016) (0.027) (0.029) 
Time effects No Yes Yes Yes 
State FE No No Yes Yes 
     
Observations 108,054 108,008 108,008 108,008 
R-squared 0.003 0.044 0.104  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Table 8: Effect of VHCs on DTP vaccine uptake 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS IV 
     
VHC 0.045*** 0.023*** 0.008*** 0.745*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.113) 
Head  0.022*** −0.003* 0.035*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Hindu  0.049*** 0.078*** 0.079*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
ST/SC  0.034*** 0.006*** 0.003 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
SES = 2  0.036*** 0.041*** 0.034*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SES = 3  0.069*** 0.068*** 0.057*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
SES = 4  0.102*** 0.098*** 0.079*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
SES = 5 (richest)  0.134*** 0.133*** 0.104*** 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
Size  −0.005*** −0.002*** −0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age  −0.002*** −0.001*** −0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
School  0.110*** 0.076*** 0.073*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Boy  0.014*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
JSY  0.060*** 0.036*** 0.027*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 0.828*** 0.478*** 0.638*** 0.603*** 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.015) (0.019) 
Time effects No Yes Yes Yes 
State FE No No Yes Yes 
     
Observations 186,682 186,567 186,567 186,567 
R-squared 0.002 0.095 0.152  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Table 9: Effect of performance of VHC on maternal health care use 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Public facility 
delivery 
Caesarean 
sections 
ANC PNC 
     
Health plan 0.553*** 0.117*** 0.587*** 1.104*** 
 (0.065) (0.035) (0.080) (0.097) 
Head 0.035*** 0.006** 0.028*** 0.054*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
Hindu 0.042*** 0.009*** 0.038*** 0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
ST/SC −0.011*** −0.015*** −0.029*** −0.044*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
SES = 2 0.029*** 0.005*** 0.059*** 0.033*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
SES = 3 0.053*** 0.014*** 0.110*** 0.082*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
SES = 4 0.077*** 0.047*** 0.165*** 0.155*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
SES = 5 (richest) 0.065*** 0.113*** 0.225*** 0.281*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) 
Size −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.003*** −0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age −0.002*** 0.000*** −0.005*** −0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
School 0.043*** 0.022*** 0.112*** 0.070*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Boy 0.003 0.005*** 0.006** 0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
JSY 0.490*** 0.007*** 0.123*** 0.269*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
Constant 0.258*** 0.073*** 0.070** 0.203*** 
 (0.023) (0.013) (0.027) (0.033) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 169,535 169,521 169,527 162,278 
R−squared 0.099 0.059 0.043  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Table 10: Effect of performance of VHC on child immunization uptake 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
 BCG Polio DTP 
    
Health plan 0.288*** 0.393*** 0.482*** 
 (0.058) (0.100) (0.070) 
Head 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.027*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) 
Hindu 0.064*** 0.030*** 0.078*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
ST/SC 0.003* −0.002 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
SES = 2 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.035*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
SES = 3 0.048*** 0.065*** 0.057*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
SES = 4 0.063*** 0.095*** 0.078*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) 
SES = 5 (richest) 0.085*** 0.144*** 0.105*** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) 
Size −0.001*** −0.002*** −0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Age −0.002*** −0.001** −0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
School 0.053*** 0.045*** 0.072*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Boy 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.016*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
JSY 0.032*** 0.084*** 0.032*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
Constant 0.772*** 0.930*** 0.514*** 
 (0.020) (0.037) (0.024) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 191,833 108,008 186,567 
R-squared 0.054 0.041  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Table 11: Effect of VHC on utilization of private health facility for deliveries 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS IV 
     
VHC −0.086*** −0.028*** −0.005* −0.668*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.085) 
Head  −0.024*** −0.000 −0.043*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Hindu  −0.016*** −0.043*** −0.045*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
ST/SC  −0.009*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
SES = 2  −0.038*** −0.036*** −0.028*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
SES = 3  −0.082*** −0.066*** −0.052*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
SES = 4  −0.123*** −0.101*** −0.079*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
SES = 5 (richest)  −0.113*** −0.096*** −0.066*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Size  0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
School  −0.073*** −0.048*** −0.043*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Boy  −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
JSY  −0.534*** −0.495*** −0.487*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 0.783*** 1.002*** 0.590*** 0.626*** 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.016) (0.019) 
Time effects No Yes Yes Yes 
State FE No No Yes Yes 
     
Observations 169,572 169,535 169,535 169,535 
R-squared 0.006 0.203 0.252  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Villages that had a VHC in 2008 
State Villages with a VHC Percentage Total number of villages 
Jammu and Kashmir 40 6.78 590 
Himachal Pradesh 81 14.75 549 
Punjab 179 22.57 793 
Chandigarh 2 50.00 4 
Uttarakhand 64 11.35 564 
Haryana 145 17.68 820 
Delhi 7 21.88 32 
Rajasthan 126 9.43 1,336 
Uttar Pradesh 714 20.68 3,452 
Bihar 29 1.71 1,694 
Sikkim 64 28.44 225 
Arunachal Pradesh 12 2.48 483 
Manipur 88 21.62 407 
Mizoram 205 52.16 393 
Tripura 80 37.04 216 
Meghalaya 79 22.57 350 
Assam 123 10.52 1,169 
West Bengal 125 16.03 780 
Jharkhand 72 7.36 978 
Orissa 41 3.56 1,153 
Chhattisgarh 139 18.83 738 
Madhya Pradesh 613 28.33 2,164 
Gujarat 324 29.86 1,085 
Daman and Diu 16 36.36 44 
Dadra and Nagar Haveli 8 18.18 44 
Maharashtra 825 46.56 1,772 
Andhra Pradesh 527 50.10 1,052 
Karnataka 466 37.92 1,229 
Goa 3 6.82 44 
Lakshadweep 9 29.03 31 
Kerala 466 71.47 652 
Tamil Nadu 615 53.62 1,147 
Pondicherry 16 28.57 56 
Andaman and Nicobar 22 28.57 77 
Total (average for percentage) 6,325 24.21 26,123 
Note: the average percentage is computed from the survey data rather than the numbers shown in the table. 
Source: authors. 
